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AN EQUITABLE, EFFICIENT AND IMPLEMENTABLE SCHEME 
TO CONTROL GLOBAL CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSIONS 
Arthur J. Caplan and Emilson C.D. Silva 
ABSTRACT 
We design an international scheme to control global carbon dioxide emissions in which 
autonomous developed and developing regions choose their own carbon dioxide emissions in 
anticipation of interregional resource transfers to be implemented by an international agency. 
This agency's objective function obeys a proportional equity principle, which preserves the 
status-quo relative ranking of regional welfare levels. We show that it is individually rational for 
each region to participate in our proposed international scheme and that regional environmental 
authorities choose policies that internalize the global environmental externalities. These results 
are especially noteworthy in light of the call for international transfers from developed to 
developing countries in the Kyoto Protocol. 
JEL classification: 72, D62, D78, H41, H77, Q28 
AN EQUITABLE, EFFICIENT AND IMPLEMENTABLE SCHEME 
TO CONTROL GLOBAL CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSIONS 
1. Introduction 
The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(called "Convention" hereafter), completed on December 10, 1997, will probably be remembered 
most for selecting emissions trading as the main mechanism to control global greenhouse gas 
emissions. However, it will also be remembered for the promulgation of another type of 
incentive: international transfers between developed and developing regions. These transfers are 
intended to: (1) "provide new and additional fmancial resources to meet agreed full costs 
incurred by (developing) countries in advancing the implementation of existing commitments;" 
and (2) "provide such financial resources, including for the transfer of technology, needed by 
(developing) countries to meet the agreed full incremental costs of advancing the implementation 
of existing commitments" (Article 12 of the protocol). The Conference of the Parties to the 
Convention, the Convention's supreme body, delegated to the Global Environment Facility 
(GEF) the responsibility of transferring resources from developed to developing regions. 
In this paper, we investigate the efficiency and implementability properties of an 
international scheme designed to control global carbon dioxide emissions. In our proposed 
scheme, the participating regions select their most desirable carbon dioxide emission quantities 
fully anticipating that an international agency, say the GEF, will implement resource transfers 
from developed to developing regions in accordance with a particular equity principle. We 
demonstrate that if the GEF's objective function obeys a proportional equity principle, which 
preserves the status-quo relative ranking of international welfare levels, both developed and 
developing regions have incentives to: (1) voluntarily participate in the international scheme; and 
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(2) efficiently control their carbon dioxide emissions. The equilibrium allocation of resources for 
the global economy in the presence of the international scheme is proportionally equitable and 
Pareto efficient. 
Intuitively, the resource transfers promoted by the GEF align the incentives of the 
participating regions because the welfare of one region can rise only if the welfare of the other 
region rises. Since the autonomous regional governments are aware of this fact when they select 
their most desirable levels of carbon dioxide emission, they have incentives to choose regional 
environmental policies that internalize the global externalities. Previous works (see, e.g., 
Boadway (1982), Caplan and Silva (1999), Myers (1990), Silva (1997), Silva and Caplan (1997), 
Nagase and Silva (2000) and Wellisch (1994)) have shown that competing autonomous regional 
governments may behave efficiently when they anticipate that regional welfare levels will be 
equalized in equilibrium. Myers (1990) referred to this phenomenon as "perfect incentive 
equivalence." This literature typically considers resource allocation problems in federations that 
have already been formed and, therefore, tend to neglect participation decisions. 
Our paper makes two significant contributions to this literature. First, we explicitly 
consider participation constraints and show that it is always individually desirable for each 
region to participate in the international scheme. This "implementability" result is novel. Second, 
we demonstrate that equalization of regional welfare levels is not necessary for perfect incentive 
equivalence. We obtain perfect incentive equivalence because the welfare levels of competing 
autonomous regional governments are positively related (i.e., they are complements) in 
equilibrium. This "efficiency" result is also novel. 
Although the focus of our analysis is not on emissions trading, this paper is closely 
related to the emerging literature on environmental markets. Chichilnisky, et al. (2000), for 
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example, show that equity and efficiency go hand in hand whenever carbon dioxide emissions 
are traded. They demonstrate that emission markets will allocate resources efficiently if and only 
if international transfers are made in order to equalize social marginal utilities of consumption. 
They also show that this resource redistribution condition can be satisfied by an appropriate 
initial distribution of emission permits. 
Our analysis provides support for this recent view that equity and efficiency play 
complementary roles in a "solution" to the global warming problem. Our results suggest that it is 
possible to achieve efficiency only if international transfers are promoted to advance some equity 
principle. In our framework, the GEF's optimal strategy entails equalization of social marginal 
utilities of consumption in equilibrium. But, unlike in Chichilnisky, et al. (2000), the resource 
redistribution takes place after the autonomous regional governments select their most desirable 
emission quantities. Indeed, it is this sequencing of moves that induces efficient behavior in the 
absence of a global market for carbon emissions. 
2. The Model 
Consider an economy consisting of two regions indexed by j, j = 1,2. Throughout, the 
reader is invited to think of regions 1 and 2 as the globe's developed and developing regions, 
respectively. Each region has an autonomous government. There are two marketed commodities, 
a commodity whose production results in emission of carbon dioxide (e.g., an industrial good) 
and a commodity whose production is harmed by emissions of carbon dioxide (e.g., an 
agricultural good). Let Xj be regionj's industrial product and E be the total quantity of carbon 
dioxide emitted in the atmosphere. We assume that E = Xl + x 2 ; that is, production of a unit of the 
industrial good leads to the emission of a unit of carbon dioxide. 
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The industrial sector in region j is competitive and consists of a large number of identical 
producers. Let k j be the (fixed) number of industrial producers in regionj. Each industrial 
producer utilizes an input quantity ZYj ~ 0 of the agricultural good to produce fj(zYj) units of the 
industrial good. We assume that f j is decreasing and strictly concave. Define zYj == k jZYj as the 
total amount of the agricultural good demanded as input by region j , s industrial sector and 
Fj(ZyJ== k/j(ZYj/kJ as this sector's production function. Hence, Xj = Fj(ZyJ. Ifwe let Px and PY 
denote the prices of the industrial and agricultural goods, respectively, the profit of the industrial 
The agricultural sector in region j is also competitive. Let mj be region j , s (fixed) number 
of agricultural producers. Each agricultural producer utilizes an input quantity ZXj ~ 0 of the 
industrial good to produce gj(zxj,E) units of the agricultural good. We assume that gj is 
decreasing in both arguments and strictly concave. Define ZXj == mjZ Xj and 
product. Then, this sector's profit is PY Yj + PXZXj' 
Region j has a large population n j of identical residents. The utility of each consumer in 
regionj is Uj(xj,yj,E), where Xj and Yj are the quantities consumed of the industrial and 
agricultural goods, respectively. We assume that uj is strictly quasiconcave. It increases in the 
first two arguments and decreases in the last. Carbon dioxide emissions are, therefore, harmful to 
each individual's welfare. 
quantities x~ and yjO denote region j' s initial endowments of industrial and agricultural goods, 
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respectively. The quantity Tj represents the total amount of income that this region receives from 
the other region (if positive) or remits to the other region (if negative) in order to satisfy the 
proportional equity principle underlying the international scheme examined below. Since the 
interregional transfers are purely redistributive, TI + T2 = ° . Each consumer in region j faces a 
Both industrial and agricultural goods are freely traded in international markets. In any 
equilibrium for the global economy, I (n jX j - x~ - X j - ZXj) = ° and I (n j Y j - y jO - Yj - ZYj) = ° ; 
o 0 
namely, the international markets must clear. To keep things simple, we henceforth normalize 
the price of the agricultural good to one. This normalization will enable us to ignore the market 
clearing condition for the agricultural good, since it is automatically satisfied whenever the other 
conditions that characterize an equilibrium allocation are satisfied. The normalization also allows 
us to set Px == P . 
3. Pareto Efficiency 
Before we analyze the making of environmental policy, it is useful to consider the 
conditions that characterize a Pareto efficient allocation. A Pareto efficient allocation can be 
obtained by choosing {x., y., x ., Y., ZX" Zy.}. to maximize u l (x l' Y l' Xl + x 2 ) subj ect to: J J J J J J J;I .2 
x j ~ 0, Y j ~ 0, X j ~ 0, Yj ~ 0, ZXj ~ 0, zYj ~ 0, j = 1, 2 . 
An interior Pareto efficient allocation satisfies: 
(Ia) 
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(lb) 
2 2 
I(njXj -X~ -Xj -ZxJ= 0, I(njYj - y jO - Yj -ZyJ= 0 , (lc) 
j=1 j=1 
(ld) 
j = 1, 2 . (Ie) 
Conditions (la)-(ld) require no comment because they are fairly standard. The first 
equality in equations (1 e) tells us that the marginal rate of substitution between industrial and 
agricultural goods for the representative consumer of region j must be equal to region j' s 
marginal cost of agricultural production. The second equality infonns us that this marginal cost 
must be equal to region j ' s social marginal rate of transfonnation between industrial and 
agricultural goods, which includes the global marginal negative effects brought upon by 
production of the industrial good in the region. From equations (ld) and (Ie), it follows that 
G~ = G~ and F~ = F; ; that is, we observe equalization of marginal products for each good. 
4. Environmental Policy Making 
Remember that the amount of carbon dioxide emitted in a region corresponds to the 
regional quantity of the industrial good produced. Then, it is reasonable to think that each 
regional government regulates the regional industrial product. Since, in our model, having 
control over a region's industrial product is equivalent to having control over a region's quantity 
of input demanded by the industrial sector, the policy instrument controlled by the regulator in 
region j is z Yj ' Regional regulators make their policy choices knowing how the other regional 
agents will behave. As such, it becomes imperative that we first consider the problems facing 
agricultural producers and consumers. 
In region j, the agricultural sector chooses non-positive {ZXj} to maximize Gj (ZXj' E)+ pZXj 
taking {p, ZX_j' E} as given. This notation tells us that - j = 1 if j = 2 and - j = 2 if j = 1 . An interior 
solution satisfies G~ +p = o. Let ZXj(P,E) and rrYj(p,E) == Gj (ZXj (P,E),E)+pZxj(P,E) denote the 
agricultural sector's input-demand and indirect-profit functions, respectively. For future 
reference, let ZXj(P, Zy"Z,,)= Zx,(P, t,F;(Zy;)) and IIyj(P,Zwzn) = IIYj(P, t,F;(Zy;)) . Note that 
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arrYj/ap == ZXj < 0, arrYj/azYj == G~F4 > 0, arrYj/azY_j == G~F;j > o. (2) 
Each consumer in regionj chooses nonnegative {xj,Yj} to maximize Uj(xj,yj,E) s.t. 
pXj + Yj = IJnj , taking {P,Ij,E} as given. An interior solution satisfies the budget constraint and 
u~/u~ =p. Let xj(P,Ij,E) and yj(P,Ij,E) be the consumer's demand functions. It is convenient, 
however, to express these demands as functions of the policy variables and the industrial good's 
pnce: 
Let Vj(p,Zy"Zn, TJ= Uj( xj(p,ZypZn, Tj}yj(P,ZY"Zn> T,l t,F;(Zy;)) be the consumer's 
indirect utility function. Given (2), we obtain: 
avj/ap == (X~ +Xj +ZXj -njxjXU~/nJ, 
avj/azYj ==u~F4 +(PF~ +l+G~F~XU~/nJ, 
avj/azY_j == u~F4 +G~F;j(U~/nJ> 0, 
(3 a) 
(3b) 
(3c) 
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(3d) 
The market clearing condition for the industrial good can now be written as follows: 
t n jX j ~' ZYl' Z Y2 ' Tj ) = t (X~ + Fj (ZYj)+ ZXj (p, ZYl' ZY2)). j=l j=l 
Regional regulators control the input quantities demanded by the regional industrial sectors, but 
not the regional input quantities of the industrial good used in the production of the agricultural 
good. The market clearing condition for the industrial good can be used to implicitly defme 
P(ZYl ' ZY2 ' T1, T2)· As we pointed out in section 2 above, we can ignore the market clearing 
condition for the agricultural good. 
We examine environmental policy making in two policy settings, one in which both 
regions participate in the international scheme to control global carbon dioxide emissions and 
another in which there is no international scheme. When both regions participate in the scheme, 
they do so voluntarily. Therefore, each region's utility from participation must be no less than its 
utility from nonparticipation (i.e., its reservation utility). Since these participation constraints can 
be adequately written only after we compute the reservation utilities, we first consider the setting 
in which there is no international scheme. 
4.1. The Decentralized Policy Game 
While it is reasonable to assume that individual producers and consumers are price takers, 
it is equally reasonable to assume that the regional regulators are endowed with considerable 
market power. He:t;1ce, regulator j chooses non-positive {zYj} to maximize vj(P,ZYPZ Y2 ) s.t. 
9 
p = P(ZYl' ZY2)' taking {ZY_j} as given, j = 1, 2.1 Assuming interior solutions, the first order 
conditions are 
(4) 
Given (3a), (3b) and u~/U! = p , we may rewrite equations (4) as follows: 
u~ =-[l+(X~ +x. +zx. -n.x.{ ~Jl(~J-nj u~ -G~, j=1,2, u~ J J J J J\ aZYj J Fi u~ (5) 
where 
(6) 
follows from differentiation of the market clearing condition for the industrial good. Comparing 
equations (5) with equations (Ie), we notice that the decentralized policy equilibrium involves 
two sources of distortion, an "externality" distortion and a "market power" distortion. The 
externality distortion comes from the fact that each regulator ignores the negative effects that his 
region's production of the industrial good generates in the other region. The market power 
distortion arises because each regulator's choice influences the price of the industrial good and 
hence the international terms of trade. As equations (6) clearly illustrate, the market power 
distortion consists of two components. The first is the marginal effect on the net global supply of 
the industrial good originating with regulator j' s market intervention. The second is the marginal 
effect on the global demand of the industrial good caused by such an intervention. Although the 
net effect is not nil in general, it cannot be unambiguously signed. 
Let V jD represent the level of per capita utility obtained in region j in the decentralized 
policy equilibrium. Since the developed region is wealthier than the developing region, we 
observe v lD > v 2D • 
4.2. The International Scheme 
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There are three players in our proposed international scheme: the regional regulators and 
the GEF. The regulators are free to choose their own environmental policies. The GEF is in 
charge of implementing resource transfers. This agency lacks political and economical powers to 
directly punish or reward the regulators for their actions. We postulate that the GEF's objective 
function obeys a proportional equity principle whereby the status quo proportion of regional per 
capita utility levels is kept constant. This function is described below. The GEF chooses the 
amount of the interregional transfer in order to maximize its objective function after the 
regulators make their choices. 
The international scheme comes to existence, however, only ifboth regions voluntarily 
decide to participate in such a scheme. Let V jS denote the per capita utility level obtained by 
region j if it participates in the international scheme. The regulators and the GEF play the 
following game: 
Stage 0: 
Stage 1: 
Each regulator decides whether or not to participate, taking each other's decision 
as given. Regulator j participates only if V jS ~ V jD, j = 1, 2. The regulators play the 
"Proportional Equity Game" below if they choose to participate. Otherwise, the 
game ends and each region gets its reservation utility level. 
The Proportional Equity Game 
Taking {ZY2} as given, regulator 1 chooses non-positive {ZYl} to maximize 
Vi (p, Zyp ZY2' T.) s.t. P = p(Zyp ZY2' Tp TJ and TI = TI (Zyp ZyJ. Similarly, regulator 2 
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takes {ZYI} as given and chooses non-positive {ZY2} to maximize v 2 (p, ZYI' ZY2' TI) 
Stage 2: Having observed {ZYI' ZY2}' the GEF chooses {TI, T2} to maximize 
M" {V
I(P,ZYI,ZY2' TI) V 2(P,ZYI,ZY2' T2)} s t '" T = 0 and = (z Z T T) 
ill v lD ' V 2D .. L...Jj j P P YI' Y2' I' 2 . 
Stage 0 is a "pre-game" stage. The regulators decide whether or not to play the 
Proportional Equity Game ("PEG" hereafter) in full knowledge of the potential gains from 
participation. The PEG consists of two stages. The regulators are Stackelberg leaders and the 
GEF is a common Stackelberg follower. The leaders anticipate the responses of the GEF when 
they select their most desirable environmental policies. The GEF observes the leaders' choices 
and makes its own choices. The equilibrium concept used for the PEG is sub game perfection. 
In the second stage of the PEG, the GEF's best-response functions, Tj(ZYI'ZY2)' j=1,2, 
satisfy: 
Vi (p(zyl' ZY2' TI (zYI' ZyJ, T2 (zYI' ZyJ), Zyp ZY2' TI (zYI' ZyJ) 
v lD 
_ v2 (P(ZYI' ZY2' TI (ZYI' zY21 T2 (ZYI' ZY2 )), ZYI' ZY2' T2 (ZYI' ZY2 )) 
- V2D 
In the first stage, we obtain the following first order conditions if we assume interior 
solutions: 
Given (8), differentiation of (7a) and (7b) yields: 
(7a) 
(7b) 
(8) 
(9a) 
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2 of. I-I =0, j=I,2. 
i=l aZYj 
(9b) 
For j = 1, 2, if we use (3a) - (3d), we may rewrite (8) and (9a), respectively, as follows: 
( {
,;.. ,;.. Of. ,;.. Of . J .(Uj u j . J Of. xo+x.+z . -n .x. _v_p+_v_p __ ) +_v_p __ -_) +p _~ +n . -~ +G) +1+ __ ) =0 
) ) x) )) az. Of. az. Of . az . z U) ) U) E az . ' 
Y) ) Y) -) Y) Y Y Y) 
(lOa) 
(lOb) 
Given (9b) and the market clearing condition for the industrial good, adding up (lOa) and (1 Ob) 
yields 
j(U~ U~ j J u;j -j -j j . Fz -. + nj -. + G E + 1 + n . - . Fz + G E Fz = 0, J = I, 2 . U~ U~ -) U~) (11) 
Since U~/U~ = u~ /u~ , equations (11) imply that F~ = F~ . Given this, we may rewrite (11) as 
follows: 
U~ =_~_ f(n. U~ +G~J, j=I,2. u~ Fi i=l I u~ (12) 
Equations (12) inform us that the regional regulators behave efficiently since their 
regulations fully account for all external effects and do not distort the international terms of 
trade. The GEF's income transfer functions are powerful enough to nullify the incentives of both 
regulators of behaving inefficiently. The transfer functions induce both regulators to face the 
"correct" price for the industrial good. 
Given equations (7) and (12), it is straightforward to show that the resulting equilibrium 
for the global economy is Pareto efficient. Besides and (7) and (12), the global equilibrium 
allocation satisfies the market clearing condition for the industrial good and the marginal 
conditions that characterize the behaviors of agricultural producers and consumers. Hence, we 
obtain: 
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Theorem 1: Assume that both regions participate in the international scheme based on 
proportional equity. Then, the resulting equilibrium for the global economy is Pareto efficient. 
Theorem 1 is good news for policymakers who wish to design an international scheme to 
efficiently control global carbon dioxide emissions. The information provided by Theorem 1 is 
only "good" news rather than "excellent" news because the result holds only ifboth regions 
participate. However, as the result below demonstrates, our proposed international scheme will 
always induce full participation. 
Theorem 2: The equilibrium for the PEG yields ViS > yiD , j = 1, 2. 
2 2 
Proof. We know that Iyis > IyiD because the equilibrium for the global economy is Pareto 
H H 
efficient. Hence, ylD (yls /ylD )+ y2D (y2S /y2D) > ylD + y2D . Since (yls /ylD) = (y2S /y2D) from (7 a), we 
have (yiD + y2D Xyls /ylD) > ylD + y2D or y lS > ylD . A similar reasoning proves that y 2S > y 2D .• 
Hence, the news turns out to be excellent! Since the equilibrium for the PEG satisfies 
both efficiency and individual rationality, the proposed international scheme yields a "win-win" 
scenario. Intuitively, the "win-win" scenario emerges because the proportional equity principle 
aligns the incentives of both regions. The GEF's optimal strategy implies that the welfare of the 
developed region rises if and only if the welfare of the developing region rises. Knowing this, the 
regulators make efficient choices. In fact, it is easy to show that this "perfect incentive 
equivalence" phenomenon occurs whenever the GEF's preferences can represented by a function 
5. Conclusion 
Our results suggest that developed and developing regions may behave efficiently in the 
presence of an international scheme in which resource transfers from developed to developing 
14 
regions are implemented to satisfy a proportional equity principle. Such transfers promote 
perfect incentive equivalence since regional welfare levels become complements: the welfare of 
the developed region can rise if and only if the welfare of the developing region rises. In addition 
to perfect incentive equivalence, our proposed international scheme always induces both 
developed and developing regions to participate; that is, it yields a "win-win" scenario. The 
efficiency and individual rationality properties of such international scheme are especially 
noteworthy in light of the call for international transfers in the Kyoto Protocol. 
We claim that our results are robust to regional policy decentralization provided that the 
structure of our proposed international scheme remains intact. It is straightforward to show that, 
as long as the GEF implements the interregional transfer in order to satisfy the proportional 
equity principle after the regional authorities choose their environmental policies, the results of 
our analysis would remain unchanged in either a setting where the regulators controlled 
Pigouvian taxes or a setting where the regulators controlled the regional quantities of carbon 
dioxide permits and later distributed these quantities to regional agents who could freely trade 
them in a market. Essentially, the reason is that the complementarity of regional welfare levels, 
which provides the rationale for our results, would still be present in these alternative and more 
complex economic settings. 
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